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TURNING POINT FOR THE WORLD
MUNICH has been avenged even in the hour of its seeming
victory. The conspirators of Munich built up the military
power of German fascism, and shattered the bastions of peace,
hoping to turn that military power -against the Soviet Union.
Thereby they let loose a different war. Thanks to their handiwork, which led first to the destruction of the liberties of the
other European nations, and then to the most dire peril of the
British people, the long-planned criminal offensive of Nazi
Germany against the Soviet Union has at length been let loose.
The Soviet people, who could have led the world in peace,
while holding fascism in check, had their policy been followed,
have now, because of the refusal of their policy, to face the
bloodiest ordeal. In place of the bloodless victories of the
peace front~ they have ..now the grimmer task to show the worl~
how to fight and defeat fascism, that monster begotten of capitalist reaction and intrigue, which the social and political corruption of the ruling structure in all t_h e capitalist countries
first unchained and allowed to ravage the world, and then
proved incapable to master. In unity with the peoples of all
Countries, they and we together will accomplish this task.
But this climax, toward which the entire policy of the Muriichites was directed, and for the sake of which they were
prepared to sacrifice the interests of their peoples, has come
about under very different conditions from their original
dream. The launching of the offensive of Nazi Germany
against the Soviet Union, which should have represented the
highest -point of victory of the whole program the sponsors of
3

Munich intended to achieve, has instead led to the victory of
the very program they intended to destroy. The launching of
the offensive of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, in
place of being followed by the M unichite ·d ream of the united
front of world reaction, has been followed by the British-Soviet
pact of mutual aid and the growing unity of the British,
American, Soviet, and Chinese peoples in the common cause of
national freedom and defense against aggression. This is the
positive achievement which shows the path of hope and confidence in the present grave hour.
We still have to be prepared to go through heavy trials. We
have to be prepared for new sharp turns in the present complex situation. But the path is step by step opening out, across
all obstacles, for the common victory of the peoples. The logic
of history is defeating and will defeat the logic of counter~
revolution.
World history always works itself out with a greater richness
and complexity, with more twists and turns than even the most
powerful political insight, the insight 'Of the great masters of
Marxism, could attempt to plot out beforehand in detail. In
the hour of Munich, when such critical alternatives opened
out before the world, none could have attempted to lay down
with certainty beforehand the precise concrete form in which
those alternatives would finally work themselves out.
At that turning point the immediate visible alternatives proclaimed themselves in three main forms: the victory at the
eleventh hour of the peace front and the checking of fascism;
the victory of the policy of Munich and the launching of combined counter-revolutionary war against the Soviet Union; or
tpe third alternative, against which the. Marxist supporters of
the peace front gave the most explicit warning, that the
fusal of the peace front by the ,t\Testern pow~rs would give rise,
not to the intended war of the combined counter-revolutionary
front against the Soviet Union, but to the Nazi offensive to the

re-
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West and the consequent outbreak of imperialist war in West-ern and Central Europe. These were in fact the immediate
alternatives between which the event revealed the final choice,
consequent on the strength of the Soviet Union and the weakness of the popular democratic forces in the West.
- But who at that time could have ventured to foretell that,
when the refusal of the peace front had in fact led within less
than one year to the outbreak. of imperialist war in Western
and Central Europe, .the very development and consequences
of that imperialist war should give rise to a situation in
which, at the moment of the launching of the Nazi offensive
against the Soviet Union, the alternative common front against
fascism should at last be formed in the midst of war? Such has
been the final working out to date of the alternatives which
opened at Munich.
Sharp turns and changes are increasingly characteristic of
the modern international situation. They are a symptom of
the extreme instability 'and breakup of the old order~ · and
especially of the complications resulting from the parallel
develDpment of .the imperialist antagonisms for the redivision
of the world, alongside the existence and growing strength of
the new type of state which is outside the system of imperialism
and represents the interests of advancing humanity and the
future world order. The problems confronting the ruling
classes in all countries are daily more acute. In the present
world situation, with the growing social and political -stress
within the old states and empires, there can be no stability.
Ceaseless sharp turns of policy must inevitably be expected, as
the leaders of imperialism strive to cleave out a way from
their dilemmas, now in this direction, now in that.
In the broadest historical sense the avenues of escape are
narrowing for world imperialism. - For over a quarter of a
century, through the first world war, through Versailles,
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through the world economic crisis, through fascism, through
Munich, through the second world war, imperialism has been
drawing the noose tighter around its neck, and, with each
twist and tum to extricate itself, adds a new knot. The forces
on our side, the forces of awakening humanity, are growing in
strength, are gathering and advancing to that unity which will
ensure victory. But in terms of immediate power, of states, of
resources, of armies, of organization, the balance is still overwhelmingly on the side of imperialism.
Therefore the whole present period requires, more than
ever in the history of the working class movement, the utmost
skill of leadership, tactical speed, elasticity, boldness of initiative, and ability to maneuver, in order to meet each turn and
new situation "\vith a corresponding policy, to prevent any
decisive unfavorable combination of forces, and to secure at
each point the most favorable combination of forces at the
given moment from the standpoint of the interests of the
working class and the future of huma~ liberation.
Only the most superficial and naive spectators are capable
of seeing in these sharp changes of the world situation and the
policy of the ruling classes, and the consequent -sharp changes
"\vhich the policy of the working class must ·carry through in
order to meet each new objective situation, not the demonstration of the instability of imperialist relations and of the
correctness of the policy of Marxism, but the triumphant proof
in their eyes of the instability of Marxism. The old parrot cry
of "somersaults" is still heard from a ~ew irresponsible critics
against the Communist Party. It appears that the Communist
Party is accused of "somersaults" because it meets changes in
the objective situation with corresponding changes it! its
policy. A party which failed to do this would not be a Marxist
party.
This i~ so elementary that it is painful to need to waste any
space in pointing it out. The accusation is as old as Marxism
6

(e.g., the contro~ersy over Marx's reversal of attitude in relation to the successive stages of the Franco-German War of
1870-71). The Bolsheviks at one time denounced a pact with
the Liberal Cadets, and at another time made such a pact. In
the summer of 1917 they demanded the convocation of the
Constituent Assembly, and in the beginning of 1918 dispersed
it by force. In the autumn of 1917 they denounced Rodzianko's intrigues for a peace with the kaiser, and in the spring
of 1918 they signed a peace with the kaiser. Everyone of
these turns raised a howI from their Ii"beral cri tics all over the
world against their "inconsistency" and "unprincipled opportunism." History has proved the correctness of these turns.
It is obvious to every observer that the present international
situation is exceptionally full of extremely sharp turns, corresponding to the extreme disorganization of all capitalist relations, which are by no means finished. Only a little over a
year ago the British and French governments were actively
prom~ting interventionist war against the Soviet Union; they
were dispatching planes and guns to fascist Finland for use .
against the Soviet Union; they had prepared expeditionary
f?rces to send, and would have sent them had not the collapse
of the Mannerheim Line defeated their plans. Germany was at
this time maintaining formal, friendly relations with the
Soviet Union. Today the German rulers are leading the most
violent aggr~ssive war in history against the Soviet Union. The
British government has signed a pact of mutual aid and
alliance with the Soviet Union.
Is not this a basic change in the international situation and
the relations of the powers? Is it not obvious that the policy
of an intelligent party must change with these changes in the
situation, if it is to be really consistent? To demand the same
policy in two exactly opposite situations would be the real
inconsistency. These myopic critics see the fly and miss the
elephant; they see the switch in the policy of the Communist

7

Party, and ignore the switch in the international situation
which has called it forth. They would accuse the thermometer
of being inconsistent because it 'registers heat in summer and
cold in winter.
A little over a year ago the official governmental apologia,
The British Case~ written by Lord Lloyd w~th a preface by
Lord Halifax, accused Hitler of the "supreme betrayal" because he had signed a pact of non-aggression with the Soviet
Union. Today Hitler is accusing the British government of
the "supreme betrayal" because it has signed a pact of mutual
aid and alliance with the Soviet Union. Is it not clear that
there is here a complete reversal in the relations of forces? A
little over a year ago Mannerheim and Tanner were held up ,
as the darlings of Western democracy and the Second International, and the Soviet strategic action for the protection of
Leningrad was denounced as bloodstained aggression. Today
these "heroes" are seen in their true colors, and. the justice of
the Soviet action is more widely understood.
At the time' Stalin was denounced by the Labor Party, in its
pamphlet on Finland, as "the Red Czar ... the executor of the
traditional imperialism of Czarist Russia. , .. an alien and
powerful despot . . . gangster . . . the real depth of the
iniquity of M. Joseph Stalin is still unknown." Now the Daily
Herald~ the organ of the Labor Party, declares: "Three 'great
figures lead mankind in the struggle to defend human freedom: Churchill, Stalin and ~ousevelt." No one in his senses
~ould dream in this moment of supreme crisis and common
struggle of launching an attack against the Labor Party ' on
the basis of this change of ,e stimation, or seek to waste time
accusing the Labor Party of "somersaults." The only sensible
question at the present moment is not whether there has been
a change in policy to meet a change in the situation, but: Is
the estimate of the situation correct? Is the policy put forwar~
to/meet it correct and adequate?
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The war crisis~ which has continuously developed and extended to its highest climax, has passed through three main
phases of development, each with its distinctive characteristics,
and each with its consequent policy for the working class and
for the peoples involved~
The first phase, of preparation, during which the world
passed imperceptibly, without a sharp distinguishing margin,
from peace into war, through a series of extending localized
conflicts, into what became in fact by its later stages already
possible to be characterized as the second imperialist war, developed from the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in the
autumn of 1931 to the Anglo-French declaration of war on
Germany in the autumn of 1939 .. During this phase the initiative was in the hands of the challenging groups of fascist
powers-Germany, Italy, and Japan-who, linked together in
what eventually took the form of the "anti-Comintern pact,"
carried forward their aggressive offensive for the new division of the world at the expense of the non-fascist imperialist
powers in possession, Britain, France, and the United States.
These powers, however, in place .o f opposing this offensive,
assisted and encouraged it, and in every way built up the
strength of fascism, conniving at every illegality and aggression, handing it new victims, breaking down the limitations
of Versailles .and shattering the peace system constructed fronl.
the last war, because they hoped to see the offensive of fascism eventually turned against the Soviet Union. This wa5
the Chamberlain policy which reached its height at Munich
and its final fiasco with the Soviet·German non-aggression
pact.
DurIng this phase the task of the working clas~ and democratic movement was to build up the strongest common front,
both within each country, internationally, and on the basis
of a coalition of states with the Soviet Union for the defense
9

of peace against aggression-or peace front-to check the of~
fensive of fascism and war, prevent its advance to general
war, and thus ' win time for the working class and popular
forces in all countries to carry forward their struggle, in conditions of peace, to solve the basic social problems at the root ot the crisis, which would otherwise inevitably sooner or later
give rise to imperialist war.
Great s~ruggles were carried forward along this line, in unity
with the Chinese, Ethiopian and the Spanish peoples, through
the People's Front in France and the Franco-Soviet pact, for
the yeople's Front in Britain and the Anglo~Soviet pact.
The Soviet Union conducted through these years a diplomatic
campaign, the initiative and statesmanship of which won uni- versal admiration, at the same time as they were able to give
material help to the Chinese people and to the Spanish people
struggling for freedom.
Today it is recognized on all sides that, had this common
front, for which the Soviet Union and the militant workers
in all countries, together with wide sections of the progressive
forces, fought during these critical years, been ,e stablished in
time, the war which broke out in 1939 need never have taken
place, or, if it had nonetheless broken out, would have
broken out under the most favorable conditions for the rapid .
success of the people's struggle.
The reactionary ruling class forces in the West, however,
represented by Chamberlain, were too strong, and were able
at that time to prevent this common front's being formed. The
'\vorking class and democratic movement was not strong
enough, or united enough, or able to find the necessary policy
and leadership, or to establish common ground with ~he opposition mi_n ority in the ruling class, to be capable of defeating the dominant Munichite policy and the rule of Chamberlain.
Munich laid bare the reactionary plans for the four-power
•
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front against the Soviet- Union. The complicated moves and
counter-moves of the spring and summer of 1939 did not
change the basic situation. Despite Lloyd George's warning,
the ill-judged guarantees to Poland and Rumania were
adopted without effective backing and without an understanding with the Soviet Union. As late as May 1939, the
Soviet proposal for an Anglo-French-Soviet pact of m\ltual
guarantee was explicitly rejected on principle, on the grounds
that it would divide Europe into two camps. On the very
egge of the outbreak of war in Europe, the Soviet military
proposals for the combined defense of Poland were rejected.
The Soviet Union, after waiting until the extreme edge of
danger to give time for the alternative forces in the West to
assert themselves, acted decisively and defeated the counterrevolutionary plans of the Chamberlains and the Daladiers by
the So~iet-German non-aggression pact, which succeeded in
restricting the sphere of the imperialist war, now made inevitable through the refusal of the peace front, and 'won
time for the Soviet Union to prepare and to strengthen its
strat~ic position. The Munichites replied by declaring war
on Nazi Germany, as soon as it had signed the pact of nonaggression with the Sovi~t Union and thus made clear that ·
its offensive would be directed against their imperialist interests. The second phase of the war, the war of the vVestern
European inlperialist powers, began.
The second phase of tIie war, which opened in September
1939, and extended to June 1941, bore the character of fun
imperialist war, even though one camp was the camp of
fascist Germany. This imperialist character of the war followed, not from the sentiments of the people in Britain and
France, who were si~cerely opposed to fascism and prepared
to struggle for their national independence and independence
of the European nations against the hated Nazi system, but
from the very different aims and policy of the ruling classes,
11

which held the power and the aims of which governed the
character of the war. The dominant pro-fascist imperialists in:
Britain and France who entered on the war in the autumn of
1939 still stood for the same basic reactionary aims which they
had pursued through Munich.
They saw the war, not as war against fascism, but as war
for their imperialist interests against a rival imperialism, and
the prelude to anti-Soviet war. For them the "supreme betrayal" of Nazism was not its war on democracy, but its peace
with the socialist state. Even while all was quiet on the Western Front, they were actively promoting interventionist war
against the Soviet Union. Their official press in the early
months openly discussed the possibilities of "switching" the
war. For this purpose they advocated a "revolution of the
Right" in Germany. Negl~cting all serious preparation or intensive rearmament measures during those critical early
months, they dispatched the planes and guns, soon to be so
sorely needed in the West, to fascist Finland for use against
the Soviet Union, which was engaged in the most urgent military operations in preparation for the future conflict with
Nazi Germany.
- Such was the character of the first stage of the war of 1939,
of the "frozen war," during which the ruling classes of the
Western powers, especially in France, directed their main
fire, not against the foreign enemy, but against the class enemy
at home, against democracy, the Communists and working
class organizations) and against the Soviet Union.
As the disastrous consequences of this policy made themselves felt · in the spring and summer of 1940, with the headlong Nazi advance and the enslavement of the nations of
Western and Central Europe, a shift in the balance 'o f relations within the ruling class followe<;J. In France the Munichites and the most open supporters of fascism carried their
12
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policy to its consistent conclusion, threw open the front, disorganized the rear, and directly betrayed their country to the
foreign enemy in order to maintain their class privileges,
even as subordinate agents of a foreign power. In 1;3ritain the
Munichite politicians were heavily discredited, but remained
strongly entrenched in positions of power.
Direct governmental leadership passed into the hands of
the alternative section of the ruling class, represented by
Churchill, which had consistently stood for an active polic)"
of opposition to Hitler, and which now opposed the tendencies of capitulation on the lines of France. The aims of this
section, while opposed to the policies of capitulation to Hitler,
were still the .aims of imperialist war against a rival imperialism, and not of a people's war against fascism. They saw the
war as a continuation of the war of 1914; their spokesmen,
as in the notorious Vansittart pamphlet, insisted that the
war was directed, not only against the Nazi rulers, but against
the G~rman people; they proclaimed the aim of a superV~rsailles which should impose upon the German people for
generations ev~n more onerous terms than the Versailles
~reaty, whose impositions had sown the seeds for Hitler_
Their strategy for victory was based on the alliance with
American imperialism, while reactionary influences continuously obstructed every attempt to establish closer relations
with the Soviet Union. This policy led to the isolation of the
British people from the dynamic forces of the European peoples struggling against fascism, and from the Soviet Union,
while involving them in increasingly heavy ' subordination, in
consequence of this isolation, to American finance-capital.
It held out the prospect of prolonged, extended, and destructive imperialist war, developing over many years and
reaching toward an imperialist treaty which would sow the
seeds .of new war. Thus, while the interests of the British
people were unalterably opposed to capitulation to Hitler

and to the criminal counter-revolutionary policies of the proHitler capitulators in the ruling class, the interests and aims
of the alternative section of the ruling class did not correspond to the interests and aims of the people. The problenl
remained for the peop~e to achieve a policy and leadership
which should express their interests, defend the~ against fascism at home and abroad, and lead the way to a peace on
the basis of the freedom of th~ peoples.
The tasks of the working class and democratic movement
during this period, in this second phase of the war, consequent
on the refusal of the peace front, corresponded to these new
conditions. The basic task remained to build up the common
front of the peoples, in unity with the Soviet Union, for the
defense of their interests against fascism and reaction, for
the real democratic anti-fascist struggle, and for the achievement of a durable peace which should be based on -the freedom of the peoples. But the failure of the fight for the peace
front and for the replacement of Chamberlain, and the consequent character of the war thereby launched, basically
changed the conditions of this fight in the new phase.
There could be no -question of applying the conceptions
of the peace front to the very different war which had arisen
through its refusal; of trailing behind the reactionary imperialist and anti-Soviet aims which were thin~y concealed behind a sho,v of anti-fascist slogans; of assisting the destruction
of democracy and working class rights, as in France, which
paved the way fQr the victory of Nazism and home fascism;
or ~upporting the military measures against the Soviet Union
which, as the outcome has shown, were an objective help to
Nazi Germany. It was necessary to strike out an independent
line, even initially against the stream, in order to make possible the conditions for a real common front of the peoples,
in unity ~ith the Soviet Union, for the protection of their
interests and ~ the victory ' of their aims.

In accordante with these tasks, the Communists and militant popular forces, in the fi~st stage of the new phase of the
war which opened in September 1939, during the "frozen war,"
while the war was still formal and before actual warfare had
begun in Weste~n Europe, strove for immediate peace. This
striving was on the basis of the proposals put out in the
Soviet-German declaration of September 28 for the opening
of negotiations, as the best means for saving the peoples of
Western Europe from being involved in war, before the irreparable' had taken place, and thus winning back the possibility for building the effective common front of the peoples
for the prevention of war.
This possibility finally disappeared with the extension of
the war in Northern and Western Europe in the spring of
1940. The most dangerous situation now confronted the
British people in consequence of the disastrous preceding
policy. The British people were now facing in isolation the
power of German fascism extending over all Western and
Central Europe-the very situation against which the Communists had for many years given warning as the inevitable
final outcome ' of the Chamberlain policy. The paramount
question now became -how to save the people in the face of
this menacing situation.
.
It was necessary to combat and defeat the policies of capitulation advocated by that section of .the ruling class which
sought to emu te the example of Vichy, without allowing
the struggle of the British people for their national independence to be sacrificed for reactionary imperialist aims which
were contrary to the interests of that struggle. From May, 1940,
the Communists put forward their concrete program of how
to save and defend the people. Against the policies of both
sections of the ruling class, they put forward the proposals for
a people's government, which should ' organize the democratic
defense of the people against fascism at home and abroad;
15
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establish the closest unity '\\>'itIi the Soviet Union and the peoples of Europe; put forward its proposals for a peace based on
the freedom of the peoples; and, in the event of those proposals being refused, carry forward the struggle, no longer
for imperialist aims, but for the aims of the liberation of the
peoples.
The victory -of a people's government in Britain, even ~ if it
had not been followed by an immediate corresponding victory
of the popular forces in Germany, and even ~f it had in consequence beeri necessary for a period to continue the war~
would have thus meant the transformation of the imperialist
war into a people's war against fascism, conducted in closest
association with the Soviet Union. This is in fact the transformation which has now taken place along another route,
not by the change of government in Britain (f<?r this the
popular forces were not yet strong enough), but by the new
situation resulting from the participation of the Soviet Union
in the war and the consequent change -in the character of
the major forces now participating in and governing the
character of the war.
-T he vindication - of the role of the Soviet Union during
these two critical years is now becoming clear even to the
blindest. Had the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet
Union taken place two years ago, in 1939, with Chamberlain
'!,nd Daladier in power in Britain and France, it is easy to
see with what speed the united counter-revdlutionary front
would have been formed against the Soviet Union. The
Soviet-German non-aggression pact smashed these plans, and
won for the Soviet Union two years for the most intensive
preparation. It won time for the peoples in Western Europe
to begin to rally their forces, and for a situation to be reached
in which the united Munichite front could no longer be .
formed. It gave time for the Soviet Union t9 take the most
active and boldest strategic measures to strengthen its entire Western frontier. Everyone of these measures was at the
16

time abused and denounced by pigmy critics, who remained
not only indifferent to the "interests of the liberated peoples
in the territories concerned, but blind to the plain strategic
significance of the steps taken in relation to the future struggle
against ~ German fascism. Today these critics may well give
thanks on their knees that these steps were taken.
There are still some lingering voices which seek to refer to
these t~o years of the most brilliant and audacious policy
of the Soviet Union as "appeasement." Their guilty consciences over their own past lead them to seek to turn the
plain facts upside down. The essence of the policy of appeasement is the successive surrender of interests, territories, or
peoples, i:n the vain hope of evading or postponing a future
conflict, with the final outcome of emerging weakened to
face the conflict. The re,cord of the Soviet Union during'
these two years was the exact opposite: Wes-tern Ukraine and
Byelorussia; Finland and the protection of Leningrad; the
. Baltic States; Bessarabia. Every step was a strengthening of
the position of the Soviet Union, an extension of its territory,
a winning of new peoples to the U.S.S.R., a thrusting forward
. of its frontier, a delay to the aggressor.
It is only neces~ary to refer to Hitler's tirade endeavoring
to justify his treacherous attack on the Soviet Union to note
the continual refrain: "I gave way with a heavy heart . . .
I had to be silent ... I advised acquiescence in the .Russian
demands ... this fresh Russian demand . . . continually renewed extortions ... I re~~ained siient because I was forced
to do so," etc. A curious form of "appeasement" on the part
of the Soviet Union. These two years of courageous, realistic,
and farsighted policy of the Soviet Union prepared the way,
not only to save the Soviet Union, but to save the peoples
of the entire world, by helping to build up that strategic
strength and readiness in the West which are today meeting
the shock of the entire Nazi military machine, showing for the
0
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first time how to stand up to that assault, winning thereby
hope and the possibility of action for every other people,
and constituting the principal-in bitter truth, at present, the
only-military barrier between the Nazi dreams of world conquest and the. peoples of the world.
By their actions during these two years the Soviet people,
assailed by thoughtless critics, were in fact performing as' signal service to the world as any in all their proud history.
By the spring 01 this year it was cleaF that the decisive turning point of the war and of the whole development of the
modern period was approaching. The war in Europe had
reached a t.e mporary deadlock. " It was evident that the impe. rialist war could only go forward as world imperialist war
between the Anglo-American coalition ana Nazi Germany
dominating Europe. But before the imperialists could embark with confidence on such a hazardous enterprise, they
were faced with the problem of the independent power of
the Soviet Union. As at every sharp turning point of the
modern period, the question of the Soviet Union "and of relations with the Soviet Union dominated the world situation.
It was evident that a heavy and evenly balanced world im- .
perialist conflict of the type contemplated would be likely to
prove a protracted war, extending with a widening destructive sweep over a series of years, and leading to inc.a lculable
consequences for the whole existing social structure.
Already the movement of the peoples was beginning to
rise in all countries. Especially the national movement8 of
revolt were growing in Europe against the hated. Nazi domination. The Nazi rulers were the most sharply conscious of
the crucial problems with which they were faced. They could
least afford to wait. Their military machine was mobilized at
its highest point. They must go forward i~ extending aggression, or go down. They were directly faced with the rising
national movements of revolt in Europe. They were acutely
18

conscious of the contiguity of the Soviet Union on their borders, with its socialist peace policy and the advancing prosperity of its people contrasting with the situation of their own
war-wracked and enslaved people and embittered subject na·
tions.
It 'was from the Nazi ruling circles that the emissary went
forth to the opposite ruling camp to tryout · the possibility
.o f . common ground for action against the Soviet Union.
There were currents in both camps which sought the possibility of resolving the conflict on the basis of turning the war
against the Soviet Union. But in fact the antagonism of irIl,. perialislll over the new division of the world, with the forces
now fully set in motion on both sides and the final trial of
strength still unresolved, was too deep to permit of any such
easy solution. The most critical point in modern imperialist
development and in the life of the peoples was approaching.
From April the Communists gave warning to be prepared for
the most sharp and sudden turns in the international situation. On May 6 Stalin took over the direct leadership of the
Soviet government-a change which bore the clearest signal,
not only to the Soviet people, but to the international working class a~d the peoples of all countries, to recognize the
seriousness of the situation and be prepared.
Where would the blow fall? What form would it take?
Nazi Germany during these critical weeks was publicly concentrating its armed forces on the borders of the Soviet Union.
Would Nazi Germany strike without prior agreement with
Britain and the United States? This became the crucial question of the international situation. To this question Hess'
voyage of exploration sought to provide the grounds for an
answer. He was the physiGal embodiment of that old diplomatic term, a ballon d' essai. It was on May 10 that Hess landed
in Britain to explore the possibilities of copaboration with

reactionary ruling circles for the purpose of the proposed attack on the Soviet Union.
While Hess' reception showed that there "undoubtedly exist~d influential reactionary elements prepared 'to consider
such proposals, it also showed that, so far as the government
was concerned, the proposals fell on 's tony ground. Why
Churchill and the authorities deliberately chose to maintain
a mysterious silence about Hess, when in fact the proposals
had been turned down, remains officially unexplained. Was
this silence, with its suggestion of some possible complicity, a
trap to lure Hitler forward on his desperate enterprise with
the hope of some possible eventual support, only to turn on
him with the most positive cOl!nter-thrust as soon as he h~d
embarked on it? Had some bright wit of British diplomacy
devised the scheme to use Hess as a boomera.ng and to catch
Hitler with his own anti-Soviet bait with which he had so
often in the past gulled .the British ruling class? Only future
records will reveal the details of this episode.
What is important for present purposes is that Hess' voyage
of exploration revealed that in fact the basis was lacking for
such an agreement. Acceptance of Hess' proposals, in the existing weakened situation of Britain, would have been ~quiva
lent to acceptance of Nazi world hegemony by Britain. There
was no road here. The deadlock continued. Only decisive
action, in one direction or another, could break it.
On June 22 Hitler struck. H i tler gave the orders for "the
greatest march in history"-against the Soviet Union. In the
midst of the war which he had no~ yet won, Hitler took on
a new enemy, the greatest military power which was alone
capable of standing up to his own. Hitler delivered his treacherous attack on the Soviet Union, not only without a declara. tion of war, but without the pretense of raising first any issue
of disagreement. This meant that the entire calculation was
based on the lightni~g thrust. Hitler struck without any prior
20

agreement with Britain and the United States. Hitler struck
against the Soviet Union, while the war against the AngloAmerican coalition was still on his hands. This meant that
Hitler deliberately took on the possibility of the war on4'two
fronts, which he had -previously made it the main political
and strategic lesson from the last war and from all German
history to avoid, and which only two years before he had directed all his efforts to prevent. What considerations drove
the Nazi rulers to carry through this reversal of their preceding policy and embark on an enterprise which inevitably
placed in the scaies the future existence of their regime?
First, strategic. Nazi' Germany could not afford to wait and
to see the gradual amassing of the strength and mobilization
of the superior potential resources of the Anglo-American
coalition, while the power of the Soviet Union remained unbroken in its rear. The only hope oto escape from the net that
was closhig in became to seek by a lightning thrust to break ·
the military power of the Soviet Union and then to turn to
advance against Britain and the United States. Thus the attack on the Soviet. Union is the decisive preli_m inary to the
attack on every other people still unconquered by Nazism.
The attack on the Soviet Union is the attack on the one effective military barrier which stands between the Nazi rulers
and their dreams of world conquest. Thereby the attack on
the Soviet Union is the attack on every people in the world.
The second series of considerations derived from the socialpolitical situation. The advancing national movements of the
subjugated peoples in Europe, who by no means intended to
place their hea~s under the yoke o~ either imperialism but
were beginning to look more and more toward the Soviet
Union as the representative of the freedom of the peoples,
as well as the growth of discontent in Germany among the
working masses, confronted the Nazi rulers with sharp probIelns. Once again t~ey sought to solve their dilemmas by vioO

~
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lent action, by a thrust at the fountainhead, at the Soviet
Union, which had already shown in relation to the Spanish
and Chinese peoples its stand by peoples struggling for freedom, and by its example inspired all ' oppressed peoples with
the hope of liberation. Thereby the attack on the Soviet
Union is an attack on the national liberation movement of
every people oppressed by fascism.
The third series of considerations was diploraatic. By the
attack on the Soviet Union the Nazi rulers hoped to divide
ruling class opinion .in Britain and the United States, on the
basis of an appeal to reactionary class sympathies; and by
this means to paralyze or weaken' their participation in the
war, and to delay the entry of the United States into the way.
Of these considerations the most important were those of a
strategic character. During the second phase of the war,
critics and commentators in the Western countries all too
often lost to view the world significance of the independent
reserve p<>we~ of the Soviet Union, which exercised its influence and remained capable of exercising its influence with
- increasing effect as events developed, on the side of the interests of the peoples and against any and every form of reactionary world domination whir-:h might threaten to arise
from the military fortunes of the conflict.
But Hitler understood this very well. When his legions
overran Poland, and the Western powers remained passive
'a nd unable or unwilling to help, it was the Soviet armies that
. barred his further advance and liberated thirteen millions of
people. As soon as the Nazi advance overran Western Europe
in the spring and ea.rly summer of 1940, leading to a complete shift in the balance and the most acute danger for the
British people, it was the Soviet forces whose presence on the
Eastern frontiers of Germany restored the balance and really
saved t4e Britisi?- people.
In this connection Hitler's own statement with regard to
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the reason why he was unable to win the Battle of Britain
and finally vanquish Britain in those critical months of the
late summer and early autumn of 1940 is worthy of note:
"While our soldiers from May 10, 1940, onwards had been
breaking the power of France and Britain in the west, the
Russian military deployment on our eastern frontier was
being continued to a more and more menacing extent. From
August 1940 onwards I therefore considered , it to be in the
interests of the Reich no longer to permit our eastern provinces to remain unprotected in the face of this tremendous
concentration of Bolshevik divisions. Thus came about the
'result intended by the British and Russian cooperationnamely, the tying up of such powerful German forces in .the
east that the radical conclusion of the war in the west~ particularly as regards aircraft~ could no longer be vouched for
by the German High Command." (Hitler's Proclamation
June 22, 1941.)
Thus the crucial role in the Battle of Britain was played
by the Soviet Union, whose forces canceled out the otherwise
ov-e rwhelming Nazi air superiority, enabled the RAF to stand
up to the remaining Nazi air forces, and saved Britain from an
ann~ilating assault. Today the British people will understand better the debt they owe to the Soviet people, not only
at this moment, but also during these preceding two years.
Thus the attack of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union is in
fact the attack on the main military barrier to its dreams of
world conquest. With the attack of Nazi Germany on the
Soviet Union the war passed from its second_ phase into the
third phase, the war of German fascism for the enslavement
of the world.
As soon as Nazi Germany launched its -attack on the Soviet
Union the critical question of the international situation became at once the attitude .of Britain and the United States.

Would the Nazi calculations to spread dissension in these
countries play on anti-Soviet ideological sympathies, and thus
divide them from the Soviet people, cut them off fro~ the
alliance which could save them, and paralyze them in the -decisive world conflict; win any success? That the heart of the
people would rally on the side of the Soviet people was certain. The last unofficial poll in the earlier lllonths of 1939
had shown eighty-seven percent of the population in favor of . .
an Anglo-Soviet pact, at a time when it was still being resisted
by the British government. But would the .understanding of
the most farsighted representatives of the ruling class equally
recognize the common interests, overriding social and political
differences, defeat the Nazi trap, and proclaim the common
cause in the present straggle? To this question Churchill's
broadcast of June 22 gave t~e emphatic answer. This was the
speech ·which Stalin referred to as Churchill's "historic utterance." There followed on June 23 the declaration of Sumner Welles on beh'~.lf of the United States. On June 24 came
the announcement by Eden of the agreement of the British and
Soviet governments to cooperate on a reciprocal basis, followed
by the exchange of missions, and fin all y the signi~g of the
British-Soviet pact of mutual aid and alliance in July. Hitler
had had his answer.
Sharp as was the reversal of policy of the Nazi rulers, who
in the preceding years leading up to 1939 had devoted all
their efforts, first by the collaboration with Chamberlain and
then by the non-aggression pact with the Soviet Union, to
prevent and avoid by every means the war on two fronts, and
now in 1941 by their own action had plunged into the war
on two fronts; . no less shatp was the reversal of policy of the
British ruling class, who in those same years had devoted all
their efforts to promoting war of Nazi Germany on the Soviet
Union, and now, when that war had broken out., had ranged
themselves with the Soviet Union.

o

It was indeed an ironic commentary on the whole preceding policy of the Clivedenite lords and ladies an,d the proHitler magnates of the City, who had ruled the roost during
those years, who had applauded Chamberlain and denounced
Churchill, w~o · had acclaimed Hit1er as their darling and
their champion against Bolshevism, 't hat now, when at last
they were to witness their erstwhile knight and champion
proceed on his so-call.ed "anti-Bolshevik crusade," they should
find themselves unable to accompany him; that, after they
had for so many years been bilked by fal'Se promises and sacrificed so much to see the ...longed-for and constantly deferred war of Nazi Germany against the Soviet Union, now
at last, when it broke out, they should find themselves conlpelled, under the leadership of the politician they had denounced, to march in a common front with the Soviet Union.
Such was the answer of the event to the poispned dreams of
Munich.

What lay behind this transformation? Two years of history.
Two years of deepened crisis of British imperialism. Two
years of bitter defeats and humiliations consequent .on the
whole preceding policy, the refusal of the A~gI9-Soviet alliance and the resulting isolation and weakness. It is only
necessary to recall the situation immediately preceding tIle
'new events, the d$ate's in the ' House of Commons during
May and June, the anxiety fol wing the evacuation of Greece
and Crete, the revelations of unpreparedness, the facts of production, the slowness of American aid, the dissensions, vacillations and alarms in the ruling class, the accusations of Petainism against leading political representatives, the new
motto which had begu.n to find currency in the popular press
that "we may lose the war," to recognize how critical was the
situation to which the British people had been brought by

the faults of their rulers. In this situation ~he Anglo-Soviet
alliance was no longer a question of political controversy; it
was an imperative necessity forcing itself on the recognition
of all; not a dissenting voice dared to make itself heard.
The Anglo-Soviet alliance came as a salvation and a new
hope, inspiring new confidence in the people. Gone were the
old days of grudging and patronizing recognition. The very
existence of the British people is now bound up with tnis
alliance. It would no doubt have been better if this understanding had come earlier; if it had come six years ago, when
this alliance was first advocated by the Comlnunist Party;
if it had come five years ago, four years ago, three years ago,
even two years ag~, when it could still have prevented the
present war.
But it may be that only the ruthless teaching of experience
could have created this wide and general understanding. War
is a harsh political school which compels its lessons to be
learned quickly or not at all. The Anglo-Soviet alliance is '
based, . - not only on the deep friendship of the peoples, now
strengthened by the sense of partnership in a common
struggle against a hated and reactionary enemy, but also on
the powerful immediate foundation of inescapable common
interests in an hour of grave danger, when the greatest possible unity is indispensable for victory. This alliance must
now become the rock and the anchor for the salvation of the
British people, and be carried forward t1:lrough the present
days of trial to victory and to lay the basis for a better future.
For the British ruling class the Anglo-Soviet alliance is the
expression of common interests in an urgent immediate
struggle. In the calculations of a ruling c~ass there is no room
for sentiment; but there is room for the recognition of practical common interests. In isolation Britain is not able to defeat Nazi Germany, and· is faced with the most acute immediate peril. American aid takes time to become effective, and the
~
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peril is immediate; further, American aid is bound up with
onerous conditions in respect to the concessions, economi<:,
political, and strategic, which have to be made. The Anglo- Soviet alliance strengthens the position of the British ruling
class in relation to the American ruling class. Undoubtedly
for the ruling class there are also ulterior calculations; and
only the politically naive would be blind to them. They are
, well aware that the colossal conflict of all the forces of Nazi
Germany and the Soviet Union weakens both, while their '
own forces and the American forces are temporarily immune;
and they look forward to a future perspective in which the
Anglo-America forces will be able to ensure those social and
political conditions which they regard -- as representative of
civilization and order, but on which the masses of the people
and the nations oppressed by fascism will have other views
when the time comes.
These issues of the future will be settled by the peoples
and their power to settle them in their own interests wil1
depend on the strength of their active struggle today. But
these issues of the future must not be allowed to stand in
the way of the maximum unity and maximum common effort
of all forces opposed to Hitlerism in the present ' struggle,
when every source of strength and every ally, irrespective of
social and political outlook, is needed for .the defeat of the
common enemy.
The war of Nazi Germany on the Soviet Union and the
British-Soviet alliance have transformed the world situation
and the' political situation in every country. Every issue need~
now to be judged in the light of this supreme conflict. The
second phase of the war, the reactionary war of the Western
imperialist powers for the new division of the world, has passed
into the third phase of the war, the just war for the liberation of the peoples against German fascism. The imperialist
rulers remain in power in Britain; they still oppress India

and the coloni'a l peoples; they maintain th~ir class system in
:Britain; they still maintain their imperialist aims.
But the objective significance of their war against Hitler
has now· become a part of the just war repr~sented by the
Soviet Union in association with the peoples oppressed or
menaced by fascism for liberation against fascism. This is the
vital issue which is now the common concern of every people
in the world, including the colonial . peoples, who have still
to win their own freedom, but .who are equally and unconditionally interested in the vi~tory of the Soviet Union and
the defeat of fascism. The Soviet Union has no im.perialist
interests or aims; the Soviet Union has from the first day
of the conflict made ,c lear that it regards the war as war
against the Nazi rulers, not against the German people; it
has made clear that victory carries with it the liberation of .
all peoples oppressed by fascism. In this way the participation
of the Soviet Union has transformed the character of the war,
. and opened the way to the participation of all the peoples
oppressed by fascism, in the common struggle for their liberation, ,vith the 'sure confid~nce that the strongest power which
is taking part in' the fighting will equally protect the interests
-of their liberation in the final settlement. The way is opened
for the · Briti~h people, fighting alongside the Soviet people,
to range themselves' for the same common aiPls of a peace
based on the freedom of the peoples.
The urgent need now is fu-ll mobilization and active unity
.of ~ll sections of the people for .the fulfillment of the tasks of
the common'struggle with the Soviet people. We strive for the
united national front of all sections of the people (not only
of the Left anti-imperialists or pro-Soviet elements, bilt of all
opposed to Hitler and supporting the pact)- to drive forward
the maximum eff~rt in the joint war. 'With the Soviet Union
for the defeat of Hitler.

The alliance needs to be made effective with the fullest
strength of the British people. We cannot be satisfied with a
situation in which one partner to the alliance is bearing the
entire brunt of the fighting, while the other remains inactive
in a military. sense. We cannot be proud of a situation in
which the Soviet Union in isolation is engaging nine-tenths
of the military forces of Nazism, while the remaining tenth,
containing mainly the older and invalid elements, is thinly
spread over the occupied countries, and the entire might of
the British empire, with sea power at its command, finds it
beyond its strength to attempt to engage or even harry the
tenth. That is a very unequal and one-sided alliance. As the
terrific battle goes forward in the East, the question of the
military second front becomes every day more pressing.
We need to combat the widespread passivity and compla-·
cency which is as fatal as it is short-sighted. We need to
awaken the people to the urgent sense of their own peril, to
the understanding that their fate depen~s on what is done
no",', The same spirit which animates the Soviet people, that
spirit of invincible dynamic energy, unsparing common endeavor and single-minded purpose, overcoming every obstacle,_
needs to be emulated here. The disorganization of production
cannot be tolerated, but, despite the limits of the existing'
structure of industry, needs to be com bated with that burningurgency which can compel action even from the most lethargic
and incompetent authorities.
'
All this can be accomplished only to the extent that the·
masses of the people themselves, and the organized workers in
the first place, act, push, drive, and take the initiative, both
politically and in the sphere of production, industry, and.
social organization. Within the broad national front the
working class and democratic movement must necessarily be'
the driving force; the need ~or working class unity and therevived activity of the labor organizations is greater than ever ....
It is necessary to be prepared for the sharpest issues of every
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type in front. The present situation, in which every day is
carrying the fate of all peoples in the balance} calls for the
greatest effort.
.
The strength of the initial stand of the Soviet people against
the onslaught of the Nazi military machine has given rise to
the most dangerous false confidence apd illusions here. Our
concern and responsibility are to see that the people of. this
country do their full part and pull their full weight in the
common alliance. This is the single practical task which governs every activity today.
.
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R. PALME BUTT

The editors are proud to announce that two. of the foremost potitical
writers in the world-R. Palme Dutt. editor of the British Labour Monthly,
and Claude Cockburn. formerly editor of the internationally known newsletter. The Week. are cabling us weekly from the British front in this war.
And from Moscow. nerve center of the Soviet . peoples' heroic struggle against
the beasts of Hitlerism, llya Ehrenburg, Mikhail Sholokhov, Eugene PetroY and
other famous Soviet writers send weekly cable accounts of the Eastern Front.
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FOR CITY COUNCIL FROM MANHATTAN

CARL BRODSKY
Carl Brodsky was born and
grew up in the heart of Manhattan's East Side - in the
widst of the $truggle in behalf
of the common peorle of our
city. As president 0 the Electrical Workers Association and
one of the organizers of Local
3, International Brothe'rhood of
Electrical Workers , he was a
member of the strike committee in the bitter strike of transit
workers in 1929 - a battle
which contributea greatly to
the organization of the great
Transport Workers Union of today. Jews know Carl Brodsky
for his courageou.s· denunciation of the Christian Front and other
local exponents of Hitlerism, as leader of numerous demonstrations at the German Consulate in protest against the persecution
of Jews in Germany. Nurses and teachers know him for his . consistent defense of hospitals and schools against the budget
slashers, the unemployed know him for his leadership in the fight
to preserve WPA and to raise relief standards.
Carl Brodsky is a charte'r member of the Communist Party
and a leader of the International Workers Order.
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